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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Yeoman is appealing from his judgment of conviction for failing to 
register as a sex offender. Yeoman alleges that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to dismiss the charge. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
In 1984, Yeoman was convicted of Rape in the State of Washington. (R., 
p. 25; PSI, p. 3.) Yeoman moved to ldaho in 2007. (R. p. 26.) Yeoman was not 
on probation or parole, but was required to register as a sex offender in 
Washington as of the date he moved to ldaho. (R., pp. 12, 26-27; Appellant's 
brief, p. 2.) ldaho charged Yeoman by information with failure to register as a 
sex offender and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 24-25, 61-62.) 
Yeoman filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the terms of the sex offender 
registry statute did not apply to him. (R., pp. 26-33.) After a hearing, the district 
court denied the motion. (R., p. 47.) Yeoman entered a conditional plea of 
guilty, resewing the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and 
pursuant to a plea agreement, the persistent violator enhancement was 
dismissed. (R., pp. 64-65, 77-78.) Yeoman was sentenced to five years, with 
three fixed. (R., pp. 87-89.) Yeoman filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 90- 
92.) 
ISSUES 
Mr. Yeoman states the issue on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Yeoman's Motion to Dismiss 
Information? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Yeoman failed to show he was entitled to dismissal where the plain 
language of ldaho Code § 18-8304 requires Yeoman to register as a sex 
offender? 
2. Has Yeoman failed to demonstrate that ldaho Code 18-8304 is 
unconstitutional? 
(1996). The court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly stated in 
the statute, unless the result is "palpably absurd." Schwartz, 139 ldaho at 362, 
79 P.3d at 721; w, 133 ldaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688, 
Thus, this Court must first determine if the statute is plain and 
unambiguous. If not, the Court must then resort to legislative history and rules of 
statutory interpretation to determine legislative intent. Finally, only if the statute 
still remains ambiguous will the Court apply the rule of lenity and resolve the 
remaining ambiguity in favor of the defendant. State v. Beard, 135 ldaho 641, 
646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). The statute in this case is clear. ldaho 
Code § 18-8304(1) reads in relevant part: 
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who: 
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an 
attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided 
for in section 18-909 (assault with attempt to commit rape, 
infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with 
a minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-911 
(battery with attempt to commit rape, infamous crime against 
nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor, but excluding 
mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child 
under sixteen years of age), 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child), 
18-1507 (sexual exploitation of a child), 18-1 507A (possession of 
sexually exploitative material for other than a commercial purpose), 
18-1508 (lewd conduct with a minor child), 18-1508A (sexual 
battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age), 18- 
1509A (enticing a child over the internet), 18-4003(d) (murder 
committed in perpetration of rape), 18-4116 (indecent exposure, 
but excluding a misdemeanor conviction), 18-4502 (first degree 
kidnapping committed for the purpose of rape, committing the 
infamous crime against nature or for committing any lewd and 
lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen, or for 
purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second 
degree kidnapping where the victim is an unrelated minor child), 
18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18-6101 1. where the defendant is 
eighteen years of age or younger or where the defendant is 
exempted under subsection (4) of this section), 18-6108 (male 
rape), 18- 6110 (sexual contact with a prisoner), 18-6602 (incest), 
18-6605 (crime against nature), 18-6608 (forcible sexual 
penetration by use of a foreign object), or upon a second or 
subsequent conviction under 18-6609, ldaho Code (video 
voyeurism). 
(b) On or after July I ,  1993, has been convicted of any crime, an 
attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another 
state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United 
States, including tribal courts and military courts, that is 
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of 
this section and enters the state to establish permanent or 
temporary residence. 
(c) Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a 
conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory, 
commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, including 
tribal courts and military courts, that is substantially equivalent to 
the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of this section and was 
required to register as a sex offender in any other state or 
jurisdiction when he established permanent or temporary residency 
in ldaho. 
I.C. $j 18-8304(1) 
Yeoman claims that the statute should be interpreted in a way inconsistent 
with his guilt. Specifically, he argues that he had no duty to register under 
subsection (l)(c) because the underlying sex offense for which he was convicted 
in another state occurred before July 1, 1993 and that "an offense which is 
substantially equivalent 'to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a)' can only be an 
offense committed on or before [sic] [after] July 1, 1993." (Appellant's brief, pp. 
7-8.) Yeoman's proposed interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the 
statute. 
Here the plain language of the statute incorporates the "offenses listed in 
subsection (l)(a)." The offenses listed have no date restriction. See, e.g., State 
v. Coleman, 128 ldaho 466, 471, 915 P.2d 28, 33 (Ct. App. 1996) (time not a 
material element of lewd conduct). If the legislature intended to include the date 
restriction of subsection (l)(a) it would have said so; by limiting the incorporation 
of that subsection to the "offenses listed" the plain language does not incorporate 
any date limitation. Here the plain language of subsection (l)(c) requires a sex 
offender convicted in a foreign jurisdiction to register in ldaho if they were 
required to register in the foreign jurisdiction when they moved to ldaho. 
Even if the language were not plain, Yeoman's proposed interpretation 
leaves the statute internally inconsistent and renders language of the statute a 
nullity. See Belt v. Belt, 106 ldaho 426, 431, 679 P.2d 1144, 1149 (1984) 
(construction of a statute should be adopted which does not deprive provisions of 
the statute of their meaning). Inexplicably, Yeoman fails to even mention 
subsection (l)(b) and says that subsection (l)(c) is the "only section that involved 
foreign convictions." (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Clearly, both subsections (b) and 
(c) involve foreign convictions. Yeoman's error on this point contributes to his 
faulty logic and results in a conclusion directly contrary to the rules of statutory 
interpretation. ldaho Code § 18-8304 has two subsections that apply to persons 
with convictions in other jurisdictions. Both have the same "substantially 
equivalent" language incorporating the offenses of subsection l(a). I.C. § 18- 
8304(1)(b) and (l)(c). Subsection (l)(b), however, specifically includes the "on 
or after July 1, 1993" language, while subsection (l)(c) does not. Interpreting 
subsection (l)(c) to include the date restriction, as Yeoman would have this 
court do, makes the date restriction in subsection (l)(b) superfluous and 
redundant. This interpretation is thus contrary to the rules of statutory 
interpretation. 
The plain language of the statute requires Yeoman to register. Therefore, 
Yeoman has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss. 
II. 
Yeoman Has Failed To Establish That ldaho Code 5 18-8304 Is Unconstitutional 
A. Introduction 
Yeoman was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender under I.C. § 
18-8307, which applies to those persons identified in I.C. § 18-8304. He appeals 
the denial of his motion to dismiss and alleges that I.C. § 18-8304 violates both 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause (right to travel) and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Yeoman has failed to demonstrate any 
constitutional violation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de novo. State v. Suiter, 138 ldaho 13, 15, 56 P.3d 775, 777 (2002); 
State v. Cobb, 132 ldaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998). The party 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute must overcome a strong presumption 
of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the statute. State v. 
Richards, 127 ldaho 31,34,896 P.2d 357,360 (Ct. App. 1995). 
"It is hornbook law that legislative enactments are presumed constitutional 
and that appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of the statute 
which upholds its constitutionality." State v. Newman, 108 ldaho 5, 13 n.12, 696 
P.2d 856, 864 n.12 (1985); State v. Dickerson, 142 ldaho 514, 518, 129 P.3d 
1263, 1267 (Ct. App. 2006). 
C. Yeoman Has Failed To Establish That ldaho Code 5 18-8304 
Unreasonablv Burdens His Right To Travel In Violation Of The Privileqes 
And Immunities Clause Of The U.S. Constitution 
The right to travel from one state to another is a fundamental right derived 
from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment and one of its 
components is the right of those travelers who choose to become permanent 
residents to be treated like other citizens of the state. Saenz 526 U.S. 
489, 501 (1999); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.1999). "A statute 
that unreasonably burdens the right to travel is subject to strict scrutiny and will 
be struck down as unconstitutional 'unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest.' However, when the right to travel is implicated 
but not unreasonably burdened, the statute need only be rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest to pass constitutional muster." U.S. v. Burkey, 
2009 WL 1616564, 28 (D.Nev., 2009) (citing Memorial How. v. Marico~a 
County, 415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974); Walsh v. City and Countv of Honolulu, 423 
F.Supp.2d 1094, 1102-1104 (D.Haw., 2006) (citing Martinez v. Bvnum, 461 U.S. 
84, 87 (1983)).) 
Yeoman claims that there is "disparate treatment" between out-of-state 
and in-state sex offenders. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) He relies on a case in 
which it was held to be a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to deny newly-arrived residents the same welfare 
benefits as established residents. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12 (citing Saenz v. 
Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999)).) The court in Saenz held that it was 
-
unconstitutional to deprive a new resident of the same welfare benefits as an 
established resident based on a one year residency requirement unless such 
deprivation was based on a "compelling" governmental interest. m, 526 U.S. 
at 502. Yeoman's case is distinguishable from Saenz because it does not 
involve a durational residency requirement and he has failed to demonstrate that 
he was deprived of any benefits of state citizenship by virtue of the sex offender 
registration requirement. 
It is more instructive to look at an ldaho Court of Appeals case where the 
court found unconstitutional a provision of the (since amended) sex offender 
registration act that required sex offenders convicted in other jurisdictions to 
register if they entered the state after July 1, 1993. State v. Dickerson, 142 
ldaho 514, 518-19, 129 P.3d 1263, 1267-68 (Ct. App. 2006). The court stated 
that the "right to travel" was burdened by statutes that either "penalize migration 
or create fixed, permanent distinctions among citizens" based upon time of entry 
into the state. @., 142 ldaho at 519, 129 P.3d at 1268. The court's analysis of 
why the statute violated the "right to travel" was as follows: 
In this case, I.C. § 18-8304 (l)(b) has elements of both types of 
classifications. It penalizes persons with pre-1993 convictions who 
moved to the state after 1993 by requiring registration when it is not 
required of like offenders who are longer-term residents, and it 
created fixed, permanent distinctions between sex offenders based 
solely upon the date when they established residency in ldaho. 
Id. at 519-20, 129 P.3d at 1268-69. Thus, the fundamental problem with the 
-
statute was that it treated persons differently based upon when they came to the 
state. 
Application of this standard shows that the statutory provision here at 
issue neither penalizes migration nor creates permanent distinctions among 
residents because it does not vary in its application by when the person in 
question enters the state. On the contrary, the statute draws distinctions based 
on where fhe person was convicted, not when he entered the state. The Sexual 
Offender Registration Act applies to "any person who": 
Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a 
conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory, 
commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, including 
tribal courts and military court, that is substantially equivalent to the 
offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of this section and was required 
to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction when 
he established permanent or temporary residency in ldaho. 
I.C. § 18-8304 (l)(c). Thus, a person has a duty to register in ldaho under this 
subsection if two criteria are met. First, the person had to be convicted of a 
qualifying offense in a jurisdiction other than ldaho, and the person had to have 
been required to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction when he 
established residency in ldaho. 
Yeoman argues that the provision of the sex offender registration act 
currently at issue burdens the right to travel because "the statute in question 
clearly treats an in-state sex offender differently than it would a similarly situated 
out-of-state sex offender." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) He has failed to show, 
however, that the statute in fact does so. Unlike the statute struck down in 
Dickerson, the current statute does not differentiate based upon date of entry 
into the state, but is instead based upon whether the conviction was in ldaho or 
out of ldaho. His argument relies in part on the faulty premise that Yeoman, a 
Washington resident who committed a crime in Washington, should be 
compared to an ldaho resident who committed a crime in ldaho. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 12-13.) This is simply incorrect. The correct comparison is to compare 
Yeoman with an ldaho resident who committed a crime in Washington. See 
People v. McGarahan, 18 Misc.3d 81 1, 815, 852 N.Y.S.2d 61 5, 619 (N.Y. Supp. 
2007). 
The statute would apply the same to a life-long resident of Washington 
moving to ldaho after release from prison for a conviction of a sex offense in 
Washington, and to a life-long resident of ldaho establishing a permanent 
residence back in ldaho after release from prison for a conviction of a sex 
offense in Washington. Unlike in Dickerson, registration is not premised upon 
the date the defendant entered the state, but rather whether the defendant had 
to register in a foreign jurisdiction when he entered ldaho. The only time the 
statute would conceivably treat persons differently based upon residency 
appears to be if an ldaho citizen is not required to establish a "permanent or 
temporary residency in Idaho" following a conviction requiring registration in 
another state. The statute, however, defines "residence" as "the offender's 
present place of abode." I.C. § 18-8303(13). Thus, it appears from the statute 
that the only time an ldaho citizen convicted in another jurisdiction (and subject 
to registration there) would avoid the registration requirements under I.C. § 18- 
8304(1)(c) would be when that person is not incarcerated for the sex offense and 
therefore did not change his place of abode. Yeoman has failed to show 
disparate treatment. 
Furthermore, Yeoman has not shown that his travel rights were infringed. 
Yeoman was convicted of rape, spent some time in prison before being released 
on parole, and was required to register as a sex offender in Washington when he 
moved to ldaho. (PSI pp. 3, 7; R., pp. 12, 26-27; Appellant's brief, p. 2.) If 
Yeoman had been an ldaho resident his entire life except for the time he spent in 
a Washington prison he would still have been required to register upon entering 
ldaho under subsection (l)(c) by virtue of his Washington conviction and his 
obligation to register as a sex offender in that state. He has been treated, 
therefore, the same way as any other ldaho resident would have been under 
similar circumstances. A comparison could also be made between an ldaho 
resident who was required to register as a sex offender who moved within the 
state. As a court found under the federal sex offender registry, "the essential 
part of the charged crime in this matter is the failure to register; the Defendant's 
right to travel is incidental to this obligation, and not necessarily affected. Such 
registration requirements place no greater burden on an interstate traveler than 
upon a convicted sex offender who travels to a different city within his home 
state, in a state where such a move triggers a re-registration or updating 
requirement." U.S. v. Clayton, 2009 WL 1033664, 18-19 (W.D.Pa., 2009). 
Under either comparison, Yeoman has failed to demonstrate that the burden of 
registering (or re-registering) upon moving is unreasonable. 
Yeoman has not carried his burden of showing unconstitutionality because 
he has failed to show that the constitutional right to travel prohibits the state of 
ldaho from differentiating between sex offenders (for purposes of registration) 
based upon jurisdiction of conviction. See People v. McGarahan, 18 Misc.3d 
811, 852 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. Supp. 2007) (requiring registration on basis of out- 
of-state requirement of registration does not treat new state residents different 
from long-term state residents). Even more importantly, he has failed to show 
that the statute treated him any differently based upon when he came to ldaho. 
Because he has failed to show that the statute violated his right to travel, he has 
failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
Even if there were disparate treatment, Yeoman has failed to show that 
the registration requirement is an unreasonable burden subject to strict scrutiny. 
The "constitutional right of interstate travel is certainly not an absolute right." 
U.S. v. Clavton, 2009 WL 1033664, 19 (W.D.Pa., 2009). In Clavton, the court 
found that the federal sex offender registration law did not violate the right to 
travel, explaining that: 
It is true that upon traveling to a new state, Defendant must register 
in the new state, while a convicted sex offender who remains within 
in [sic] a state need only remain properly registered. However, the 
Court fails to see a constitutional violation in this distinction. Where 
a person moves to a new state, he needs to obtain a new driver's 
license and vehicle registration: frankly, this licensing process can 
be an irritating hassle; however, the motor vehicle and licensing 
requirements certainly do not unduly infringe upon anyone's right to 
travel. Furthermore, signing up for utilities in some parts of this 
country is an exercise in frustration. Essentially, seemingly 
innumerable administrative requirements place burdens upon those 
who move. Yet following Defendant's line of reasoning, this Court 
should strike down these pesky local administrative burdens, 
because they are an impediment to moving. . . the Court does not 
mean to minimize the substantial stigma that accrues from 
compliance with registration requirements. Nonetheless, such laws 
were appropriately passed by the legislative branch, and cannot be 
invalidated absent a showing of a specific constitutional violation. 
Id. 
-
The Court in Clavton found that the burden imposed upon Defendant's 
right to travel was not unreasonable, but was necessary to achieve a compelling 
interest, stating that, "obviously, all sex offender registration requirements are 
burdensome, and the consequences of such lists interfere greatly with a 
registrant's freedom to work and to participate in society; however, society, 
through its legislative processes, has decided again and again that it has a 
compelling and strong interest in preventing future sex crimes." Clayton, 2009 
WL 1033664, 18 -19 (W.D.Pa., 2009). 
Similarly, the U.S. District Court in Nevada noted that "sex offenders 
traveling from state to state may still do so freely without first seeking permission 
from authorities" and held that the inconvenience of updating one's registration 
upon traveling interstate is justified in light of the purpose behind the registration 
requirements. U.S. v. Burkey, 2009 WL 1616564, 28 (D.Nev., 2009). "The state 
has a strong interest in preventing future sexual offenses and alerting local law 
enforcement and citizens to the whereabouts of those that could reoffend. 
Without such a requirement, sex offenders could legally subvert the purpose of 
the statute by temporarily traveling to other jurisdictions for long periods of time 
and committing sex offenses without having to notify law enforcement." U.S. v. 
Burkey, 2009 WL 1616564, 28 (D.Nev., 2009)(citing Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 
1337, 1349 (I lfh. Cir. 2005)) 
Even if the statute did burden his right to travel, and were subject to strict 
scrutiny, it does not violate the constitution if, pursuant to strict scrutiny,' the 
distinction drawn by the statute furthers a legitimate state purpose. Dickerson, 
142 ldaho 514, 520, 129 P.3d 1263, 1269. Yeoman's total argument on this 
point is that, "The State has set forth no compelling governmental reason for the 
disparate treatment." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) Pointing out that the state has 
not done something is not sufficient to carry Yeoman's burden of proof. The 
state requests that the Court reject Yeoman's challenge to the statute because 
he has not carried his burden. See I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 
263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either 
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.") 
If the court reaches the question of a legitimate state purpose, review 
shows that the statute passes constitutional muster. The governmental interest 
in preventing sex abuse and in knowing the location of sex offenders is 
compelling. See Connecticut Dep't of Public Safetv v. Doe, 538 U.S. I ,  4 (2003) 
(sex offenders are a serious threat and are "much more likely than any other type 
of offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual assault"). The risk of 
recidivism is "frightening and high" and often occurs in a different state. Smith v. 
Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103-04 (2003) (internal quotation omitted.) Allowing sex 
-
' The Dickerson court noted that a lesser standard of review (such as rational 
basis) might apply if a statute was deemed to not infringe on migration but 
instead created permanent distinctions based upon time of entry into the state. 
Dickerson, 142 ldaho at 520, 129 P.3d at 1270. The state submits that the 
statute survives strict scrutiny, and therefore would also pass muster under a 
lesser standard. Nevertheless, this Court should apply the correct standards of 
review. 
offenders to avoid registration by simply coming to ldaho would also subvert the 
purpose of sex offender registration laws in existence in other states. Thus, 
requiring those already subject to another state's registration requirements to 
register upon coming to ldaho constitutionally furthers a governmental interest. 
see Miller v. State, 971 So.2d 951, 954 (Fla. App. 2007) (upholding statute 
-
requiring persons required to register as sex offenders in another state to register 
in Florida if they establish or maintain a residence in Florida); P e o ~ l e  v. 
McGarahan, 18 Misc.3d 811, 814, 852 N.Y.S.2d 615, 619 (N.Y. Supp. 2007) 
("States have a legitimate interest in requiring offenders who commit registerable 
offenses in other jurisdictions to register in their new state of residence. 
[Otherwise] an offender could avoid sex offender registration requirements 
simply by moving his state of residence, thereby frustrating the purpose behind 
sex offender registration laws.") ldaho has a compelling interest in preventing 
sex offenders from avoiding registration laws by moving to Idaho. Thus, the 
statute survives strict scrutiny. 
Yeoman has failed to show that the requirement that he register in ldaho 
violated his right to travel as guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the Constitution and consequently, he has failed to show that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 
D. Yeoman Has Failed To Establish That ldaho Code S 18-8304 Violates 
The Eaual Protection Clause Of The U.S. Constitution 
Yeoman also argues that requiring him to register violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution under a rational review standard. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-17.) 
The Equal Protection Clause embraces the principle that all persons in 
like circumstances should receive the same benefits and burdens of law. Equal 
protection issues focus upon classifications within statutory schemes that 
allocate benefits or burdens differently among the categories of persons affected. 
State v. Reed, 107 ldaho 162, 167-168, 686 P.2d 842, 847-848 (Ct. App. 1984). 
A classification satisfies equal protection under the rational basis standard if it is 
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and if any conceivable set 
of facts would support it. State v. Mowrey, 134 ldaho 751, 755, 9 P.3d 1217, 
1221 (2000); State v. Bowman, 104 ldaho 39, 41, 655 P.2d 933, 935 (1982). 
Equal protection does not require that all persons be treated alike, but only that 
similarly situated persons be treated alike. 
Yeoman argues that Doe v. McVey, 381 F.Supp.2d 443, 449 (E.D. Pa. 
2005), affd Doe v. Pennsvlvania Board of Probation and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 
107-11 (3d Cir. 2008), is "directly on point." (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16.) Even 
a cursory glance at that case, however, shows that it has almost no relationship 
to this case. First, Doe did not even challenge his obligation to register in 
Pennsylvania based upon his New Jersey conviction. Doe, 513 F.3d at 107. He 
challenged only the community notification provisions that required flyers 
announcing his violent predator sex offender status be passed around in his 
neighborhood. u The basis of his challenge was that persons on parole in 
Pennsylvania who were convicted within the state were subject to community 
notification only if they were adjudicated to be a "sexually violent predator" in a 
civil hearing while persons on parole in Pennsylvania who were convicted outside 
of the state were automatically subject to community notification requirements. 
Id. at 98.' The court determined that protection from sex offenders was a 
-
legitimate governmental interest, and phrased the question presented as 
"whether the Commonwealth's denial of equivalent process to both in-state and 
out-of state parolees is rationally related to its security concerns." !& at 108. 
The court ultimately held that there was no rational basis for treating parolees 
convicted in-state so differently than those convicted out-of-state. Id. at 107-1 1. 
This case is significantly different. Unlike Doe, Yeoman is challenging his 
duty to register - not a classification as being a "sexually violent predator" subject 
to community notification. Likewise, ldaho sex offenders are not provided extra 
process not provided to out-of-state sex offenders in ldaho, as was the case in 
Doe. Thus, the analysis of whether these vastly different statutory provisions are 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest is of minimal utility in this case. 
In this case, the state has not only the legitimate interest of protecting the 
community from sex offenders, but the legitimate interest in preventing sex 
offenders subject to registration elsewhere avoiding those registration 
requirements by coming to ldaho, and the legitimate interest in preventing this 
The statute governing Idaho's procedure for declaring someone a violent sexual 
predator is found at I.C. § 18-8314. Nothing in the record indicates that such a 
designation was at issue in this case. 
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interest in preventing this subversion of those states' registration requirements. 
Protection of these interests is rationally related to requiring those already 
mandated to register in another state to also register when they come to Idaho. 
Miller v. State, 971 So.2d 951, 954 (Fla. App. 2007); People v. McGarahan, 18 
Misc.3d 81 1, 852 N.Y.S.2d 61 5 (N.Y. Supp. 2007). 
Yeoman has failed to carry his burden of showing the statute is 
unconstitutional. He has therefore necessarily failed to show error in the denial 
of his motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
denial of Yeoman's motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 17th day of July 2009. 
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